Political Particularism around the World: 1978-2001
Metadata & use
| Identifier | https://doi.org/10.60966/gu9wbgds |
|---|---|
| License | Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial–NoDerivs 3.0 IGO |
| Related Knowledge Product | |
| Citation |
Scartascini, Carlos, et al. (2015). Political Particularism around the World: 1978-2001. IDB Open Data. https://doi.org/10.60966/gu9wbgds |
| Published date | 2015-03-04 |
| Modified date | 2026-07-15 |
| Tags/Keywords | Political Participation |
| Language |
|
| Temporal coverage | 1978-2001 |
| Country |
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cape Verde
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo - Brazzaville
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Congo - Kinshasa
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eswatini
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Côte d’Ivoire
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar (Burma)
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
North Korea
North Macedonia
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
St. Lucia
San Marino
São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovenia
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Gambia
Netherlands
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Türkiye
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
|
| Region | Latin America and the Caribbean |
| Publisher |
Inter-American Development Bank
|
| Author |
Scartascini, Carlos
Franco, Maria
|
| Data collection type | Administrative Data |
| Statistical type | Cross-sectional Data |
| Data structure | Structured Data |
| Data notes |
What is the “Political Particularism around the World” dataset?This dataset estimates how much individual politicians further their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies vs party constituencies — essentially measuring political particularism. It provides the values behind a political particularism index. Which years and countries are covered?The dataset spans 1978 to 2001 and covers a wide set of countries globally. Who authored and published it?Authors include Jessica Seddon Wallack, Alejandro Gaviria, Ugo Panizza, and Ernesto Stein. It’s published via the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). What indicators does it include?
How is the political particularism index interpreted?Higher values indicate that individual politicians derive more influence (or career success) from focusing on geographic constituency appeals (local), rather than broad party constituency appeals. What research questions can be answered with this dataset?
What are the dataset’s limitations or caveats?
What is political particularism in simple terms?Political particularism refers to situations in which politicians advance their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies rather than to broad national or party constituencies. The dataset measures this through electoral system indicators such as district magnitude, ballot structure, and proportionality. What is the difference between political particularism vs universalism comparison?The dataset tracks particularism by coding electoral rules that encourage candidate-centered appeals (e.g., open-list proportional representation). Universalism, by contrast, implies policies or appeals that benefit broad groups. Countries with small district magnitudes and candidate-centered voting tend to score higher on particularism. What are real-world examples of political particularism in modern government?The dataset shows that countries such as Brazil (open-list PR) and Colombia (candidate-centered systems) exhibit higher levels of particularism, as politicians rely on localized appeals. In contrast, closed-list systems in parts of Western Europe reduce particularist incentives. Why do political parties adopt particularist strategies?Electoral incentives drive this choice. When district magnitude is small, or ballots emphasize individual candidates, politicians gain by targeting narrow constituencies. The dataset’s indicators (e.g., ballot type, district magnitude) highlight these institutional mechanisms. How does political particularism affect minority representation?The dataset suggests that in systems with high district magnitude and proportional representation, minority groups may gain seats. However, candidate-centered systems can fragment representation, making minority advocacy dependent on localized appeals. What is the difference between clientelism and political particularism?Clientelism involves direct material exchanges (jobs, favors) for votes. Particularism, as measured in the dataset, is institutional: it reflects electoral rules that incentivize narrow appeals. They overlap but are distinct—particularism is structural, clientelism is behavioral. What is the role of political particularism in public policy making?The dataset shows that in countries with high particularism scores, legislators are more likely to push for geographically targeted spending (“pork barrel”) rather than universal programs. This is inferred from electoral system indicators like district magnitude and ballot type. What is the formal definition of political particularism in contemporary political theory?Formally, political particularism is the extent to which politicians can advance their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies rather than broad party constituencies. This definition underpins the construction of the dataset. The dataset operationalizes particularism using variables such as: - Ballot type (candidate vs party-centered) - District magnitude (number of seats per district) - Proportionality index (degree of proportional representation) These indicators enable cross-country comparisons of levels of particularism. What is the impact of electoral systems on political particularism?The dataset shows that open-list proportional representation systems increase particularism, whereas closed-list systems reduce it. District magnitude also matters: smaller districts heighten particularist incentives. What is the political particularism index definition?It is an index derived from electoral system variables (ballot structure, district magnitude, proportionality) that quantifies the extent to which politicians rely on narrow constituencies rather than broad party appeals. How is political particularism measured in political science?Political scientists use datasets like this one to code electoral rules across countries and years. Indicators such as ballot type (candidate vs party), district magnitude, and proportionality are combined to produce a measure of particularism. What is the relationship between political particularism and legislative 'pork barrel' spending?The dataset highlights that systems with high particularism scores (small districts, candidate-centered ballots) are more prone to pork barrel politics, as legislators seek localized benefits to secure re-election. What is the impact of open-list proportional representation on political particularism levels?Countries with open-list PR systems (e.g., Brazil) score higher on particularism, since candidates must cultivate personal votes and localized appeals rather than relying solely on party platforms. |